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Introduction  
Winston Churchill described democracy as "the worst form of government except for all those 
others that have been tried."[1] According to Mohamed Abed Jabri, a contemporary Arab 
philosopher, "democracy is the only principle of political legitimacy which is acceptable nowadays 
in Muslim societies."[2] Abdul Karim Soroush, an Iranian Islamic reformist, opined: "Islam and 
democracy are not only compatible, their association is inevitable. In a Muslim society, one 
without the other is not perfect."[3]  
As these statements reflect, democracy has become the preferred type of governance in the 
world as well as the Middle East. Over sixty percent of the countries of the world are defined as 
electoral democracies.[4] Not surprisingly, democracy offers considerable advantages. Political 
scientists Bruce Russett and John R. Oneal found that "the risk of conflict declines as the 
proportion of democracies in the international system increases."[5] In addition to this pacifying 
influence, democracies are better at providing for their citizens’ needs. Amartya Sen, the recipient 
of the 1998 Nobel Prize for Economics, demonstrated this point: 
"No substantial famine has ever occurred in any independent and democratic country with a 
relatively free press … [in comparison] China, although it was in many ways doing much better 
economically than India, still managed (unlike India) to have famine … the largest recorded 
famine in world history: Nearly 30 million people died in the famine of 1958-61, while faulty 
government policies remained uncorrected for three full years."[6]  
Moreover, The Economist reports "across scores of countries and centuries of history, democracy 
has promoted growth far more effectively and consistently than any other political system."[7]  
In spite of democracy’s benefits and Middle Easterners’ acknowledgement of its benefits, no 
democracies—either liberal or electoral—exist in any Arab Middle Eastern states.[8] Most states 
are autocratic. In February 2005, Egyptian President Hosni Mubarak called for an amendment to 
Article 76 of the constitution to allow for multiple candidates and parties to participate in 
presidential elections. Shortly thereafter, his security forces arrested, beat and intimidated vocal 
opponents—most notably former parliamentary member Ayman Nur.[9] In Jordan, King Abdallah 
II has made little progress on reform. Neil Hicks, Director of Human Rights First’s Special 
Initiative on the Middle East, comments: "On paper, the Jordanian government has committed 
itself to many basic rights and freedoms. But… Jordan’s commitment to human rights remains 
unfulfilled."[10] Meanwhile in Saudi Arabia, women live in a state of "gender apartheid."[11] Saudi 
women are not permitted to drive a vehicle, must be accompanied by a male relative to be 
admitted into a hospital, and have limited employment opportunities.[12] On March 11, 2002 in 
Mecca, fifteen girls died in a fire because Saudi Arabia’s religious police refused to let the girls 
leave the burning building without their hijab and abaya. In fact, witnesses claimed the police 
were "beating young girls to prevent them from leaving the school because they were not wearing 
the abaya."[13]  
Inarguably, reform is necessary and crucial to the Middle East. Following the tragic events of 9/11, 
President George W. Bush used the event as an impetus to remedy this Arab peculiarity and 
democratic deficiency. Though literature abounds regarding the doubtful efficaciousness of 
exogenous pressure effecting fundamental democratic changes, few scholars or commentators 
have satisfactorily explained the reason for such pessimism. For example Larry Diamond wrote, 
"Except for rare instances, democracy does not work when foreign models are imposed... Nor 
can Americans impose a preference for democracy where it does not exist."[14] What is missing 
in this equation is why. Few have addressed this question directly. Most have chosen to exhaust 
their energies on debating the Bush administration’s sincerity and credibility.[15] A satisfactory 
explanation becomes more crucial as conflicting narratives emerge from the region. In an 
interview on March 15, 2005, Jordan’s King Abdullah II stated:  
"...many societies throughout the Middle East have been talking about reform, but [because] 
there seems to, and may be a strong American position for the Middle East to move toward 
reform... in Jordan it has allowed us to actually push the envelope even more. And if there hadn’t 
been that call, then I think that we’d have been much more complacent about it."[16]  
Finding a satisfactory and persuasive explanation to why external pressure is unlikely to lead to 
the institutionalization of democracy in the Middle East is daunting. Added to the anticipated 
challenges which democracy faces in heterogeneous environments, the region’s complexity, and 
its historical and cultural aversion to foreign encroachment of any kind, exacerbates the situation. 
Nonetheless, the presence of these challenges does not necessarily mean the inevitable failure 
of democracy. A systematic method is needed to analyze the problem within context and offer 
objective insight to support or refute positions.  
Social movement theory (SMT) provides a systematic framework of analysis. SMT offers a 
holistic approach for identifying and interpreting components of a public, demand-making 
movement as well as analyzing the interactive dynamics of these components and relations with 
other movements and opposing pressures. Consequently, SMT may provide greater analytical 
understanding to why democracy cannot be inoculated since it enables the study of both static 
and variable aspects. This essay represents an initial effort to illustrate that the U.S. promotion of 
democracy in the Middle East can be viewed within a SMT framework. More specifically, 
President Bush’s calls for the advancement of democracy in the region have been translated by 
the region to mean the launching of the "American" democracy transnational social movement. 
Establishing that an "American" democracy transnational social movement does exist is 
necessary to be able to understand subsequent reactions, such as the formation of counter 
movements and state responses. Though as yet preliminary, viewing "American" democracy as a 
social movement is instrumental to comprehending the mechanisms that may retard reforms in 
the Middle East.  
"American" Democracy as a Transnational Social Movement  
As Samuel P. Huntington proposed, "American" democracy is transnational. A transnational 
organization or social movement has "... directed operations in territories of two or more nation-
states."[17] Though rare, transnational social movements do exist and are connected to national 
processes. Reviewing the Catholic Emancipation movement of Britain from 1780 to 1829, Tilly 
found that "histories... reveal powerful analogies between the processes driving social 
movements within national polities and a range of other processes, both ‘national’ and 
‘international.’"[18] He continued "both state-led and state-seeking [transnational in nature] 
nationalisms share interesting properties with social movements... they involve parallel political 
processes [such as claim making, opposition to power holders, identity formation, consensus 
building, collective action or armed confrontation]."[19] Consequently, these findings "rectify 
common conception of social movements as sui generis."[20] In addition, the international and 
domestic processes are in "incessant interaction" and not "quite independent one from the other." 
In other words, the interaction between transnational social movements and domestic social 
movements is not without precedent. Social movements are not simply confined to the 
boundaries of a state—that is, they are not uniquely a domestic formation. Further, social 
movements that emerge from outside of the state, interact like an indigenous movement once 
within the state. For example, the 1830’s Protestant movement, which originated from Western 
nations such as Britain and the United States, sought "political change as a preface in China’s 
spiritual conversion."[21] In their efforts to convert the Chinese, Suzanne Wilson Barnett found 
that "Rather than encouraging... [the] Chinese to be more receptive to Western intrusion, the 
missionaries inadvertently supported China’s inhospitality to the West... the missionaries 
pinpointed threats to distinctive features of China’s own civilization [they wrote of presidents and 
kings and not emperors, of an educational system not founded on Confucianism]. In short, the 
missionaries characterized China’s ‘enemies’ and helped to perpetuate Chinese distrust of 
Westerners."[22]  
Like the Protestant movement of 1830’s, "American" democracy is a social movement. However, 
it is fundamentally different from missionary movements or other social movements such as 
Hamas, the Muslim Brotherhood, or the Civil Rights movement of the 1960’s. While these 
aforementioned movements emerged from domestic non-state sources, "American" democracy is 
the product of the U.S. government and designed to change Middle Eastern states. Theoretically, 
domestic changes, i.e. new ruler, type of government, should result from internal sources, 
competition or pressures. Yet, the United States with its considerable political leverage—seen as 
its mass—and public demands is the one pressuring and effecting internal changes within 
sovereign polities. This realization is engendering responses which mimic reactions to social 
movements. Specifically, Middle Easterners are interpreting U.S. advocacy for change or 
democracy as a social movement or an organized campaign against the state which locals 
believe they should have a priority in influencing on domestic issues. Alternatively, American 
demands are competing with indigenous groups’ perceived legitimate right to demand changes 
from the state, and, thereby, the United States is undermining local social movements’ 
prerogative to decide what changes should be included on the agenda for consideration. For 
example, the Muslim Brotherhood in Jordan may place changes in education or social affair as 
more important than liberal democracy, but find their preferences overshadowed by American 
demands. In addition, individuals are also reacting to "American" democracy. In the process of 
mobilizing support for change, the U.S. government has framed the region and by extension the 
people so negatively that many feel compelled, in spite of the realities, to defend the region and 
offer an alternate, competing perspective. One commentator proffered, "Respect our religion and 
our culture and don’t interfere in our domestic affairs. Leave us alone and we can solve our own 
problems. We can build our own democracy by our own efforts, we don’t need your help. This is 
our task, not yours."[23] In sum, the competition for influence over the state and framing of the 
region is compelling the Middle East to view and treat "American" democracy as a real social 
movement.  
Furthermore, the fact that "American" democracy emerged from foreign policy does not detract 
from its character as a transnational social movement. Tilly defined social movement as "a sort of 
campaign... [that] demands righting of a wrong... suffered by a well-specified population."[24] 
President Bush defended the promotion of democracy as part of a "broad and sustained 
campaign to secure our country and eradicate the evil of terrorism."[25] The similarities between 
Tilly’s and Bush’s comments extend beyond idioms. Both convey the same meaning. Also, the 
term "American" democracy is not meant to connote a unique brand of democracy, but simply to 
specify the promoter—the United States. This distinction is significant given Middle Easterners’ 
apprehension and general mistrust of American intention even when they support the 
incorporation of democratic practices within their society.[26] Thus, these unfavorable views of 
American sponsored efforts impact Middle Easterner’s reception, perception and behavior. As the 
Secretary General of the Islamic Action Front pondered, "How can we be convinced of the 
democratic reform promoted by Bush? At the same time he is asking dictatorial regimes to tighten 
their controls of Islamists [who lead movements of change and resistance], shut down their 
charitable organizations... We don’t have any confidence in this reform discourse."[27] 
Furthermore, "American" democracy, as outlined in the Middle East Partnership Initiative, has the 
goal of establishing "expanded public space where democratic voices can be heard in the political 
process, the people have a choice in governance, and there is respect for the rule of law."[28]  
President Bush follows a long legacy of foreign policy makers and is not the first American 
president to promote democracy in the region. As the forty-third president of the United States, he 
is but one in the continuum of presidents that have used or promoted democracy and its ideals. 
Woodrow Wilson zealously marketed democracy. He declared "The idea of America is to serve 
humanity... [it is] a very perilous thing to determine the foreign policy of a nation in terms of 
material interest."[29] Backing his words with action, in 1916 he sent forces into Mexico to "teach 
Mexicans the meaning of democracy."[30] In the Middle East, Truman declared "I believe... it 
must be the policy of the United States to support free peoples who are resisting subjugation by 
armed minorities or by outside pressures."[31] Ronald Reagan added "If America were to walk 
away from Lebanon, what chance would there be for a negotiated settlement producing, a unified, 
democratic Lebanon."[32]  
The end of the Cold War era and concomitant collapse of the quintessential communist state 
ushered in the proliferation and dominance of democratic states. Presidents George H. W. Bush 
and Bill Clinton made the promotion of democracy one of the main pillars of their foreign 
policy.[33] In keeping with this American tradition, President George W. Bush also embraces 
democracy as his key foreign policy pillar. At the 20th Anniversary of the National Endowment for 
Democracy in 2003, President Bush commented on America’s stewardship and the rise of 
democracies. He noted:  
"In June of 1982, President Ronald Reagan... declared, the turning point had arrived in history... 
Soviet communism had failed.... In the early 1970s, there were about 40 democracies in the 
world... As the 20th century ended, there were around 120 democracies in the world—and I can 
assure you more are on the way... We've witnessed, in little over a generation, the swiftest 
advance of freedom in the 2,500 year story of democracy. Historians in the future will offer their 
own explanations for why this happened. Yet we already know some of the reasons they will cite. 
It is no accident that the rise of so many democracies took place in a time when the world's most 
influential nation was itself a democracy."[34]  
President Bush’s promotion of democracy parts ways with his predecessors in that his rhetoric 
combined with his actions has had the psychological impact of transforming his foreign policy into 
a transnational social movement. President Bush’s address to the nation on September 7, 2003 
surmised his views. "The Middle East will either become a place of progress and peace, or it will 
be an exporter of violence," he stated.[35] In another venue, he described the region as "a place 
of tyranny and despair and anger."[36] In his choice of words, he accentuates the differences 
between the region and the rest of the world. In so doing, he has caused Middle Easterners to 
conduct a defensive reassessment of their identity as well as a reassessment of "the other" or the 
United States. Prime Minister Mahathir Mohamad of Malaysia reflected this introspection during 
his address to the Islamic Summit Conference. He voiced: 
"Today we, the whole Muslim ummah are treated with contempt and dishonour... None of our 
countries are truly independent. We are under pressure to conform to our oppressors' wishes 
about how we should behave, how we should govern our lands, how we should think even... [to] 
our detractors and enemies... we are all Muslims... whom they declare promotes terrorism, and 
we are all their sworn enemies. They will attack and kill us, invade our lands, bring down our 
Governments whether we are Sunnis or Syiahs, Alawait or Druze or whatever [sic]."[37]  
While Bush may not have intended to pursue his foreign policy as a social movement, Middle 
Easterners have translated it as such. Ted Hopf highlights in Social Construction of International 
Politics "the power that a social cognitive structure exerts can best be illustrated in terms of 
language."[38] Further, through discourse identities, which are relational, are created, reinforced, 
or amended. In other words, verbal communication is subject to the audience’s interpretation 
which is bound by the interpreter’s sense of identity, norms, and context. Perceptions which are 
based on a cognitive calculus create reality. If within this social context or norm American 
intentions are viewed as hostile, then subsequent American actions and words are likely to be 
filtered through those lenses. Indeed, the Pew Research Center found evidence of this filtered 
interpretation. Specifically, they found that "the perception that Western nations are not fair in 
their stances toward Palestine fits in with a more generalized that the West is unfair to the Arab 
and Islamic worlds... it is one of several examples of Western bias that might extend to 
Afghanistan, Iraq, Gulf oil and other situations."[39] Head of the Arab American Institute James 
Zogby revealed in his interviews of Arabs in the region that the Middle East’s opposition to the 
United States "... is not a foreign policy issue... It defines almost existentially their sense of who 
they are."[40]  
Inside the Operational Structures of "American" Democracy  
The international climate in 1998 was beginning to provide the political opportunity structure for 
an "American" democracy social movement. On February 23rd, Osama bin Ladin issued his 
fatwah calling for Muslims "to kill the Americans and their allies -- civilians and military."[41] On 7 
August, Al-Qa’ida attacked U.S. embassies in Nairobi, Kenya and Dar es Sala’am, Tanzania. On 
October 28th, Israel and Palestinians signed the Wye Memorandum. The document called for 
Palestinians to combat terrorism. On February 7,1999, after four decades of power King Hussein 
of Jordan, the region’s longest ruling leader, passed away. His son Prince Abdullah, an untested 
leader, took his mantle. Similarly, in Syria President Hafez al-Assad died on June 10, 2000. His 
son Bashar al-Assad assumed the presidency. On October 12th, Al-Qa’ida attacked the U.S.S. 
Cole in Aden Harbor, Yemen. On September 28th, the second Palestinian intifada—al Aqsa—
began. In January 2001, President George W. Bush was inaugurated. One month later, Prime 
Minister Ariel Sharon took power. And on September 11th, al-Qa’ida attacked the World Trade 
Center and Pentagon using civilian airliners as weapons. Over 3,000 people were killed.[42]  
The country was shocked, angry, saddened and confused. American citizens’ reactions ranged 
from "America should act like a superpower, no matter the cost, and take whatever action is 
needed to prevent terrorist groups from launching new attacks,"[43] to "America needs to stand 
vigilant to remain as a beacon of hope for the world."[44] The international community also 
reacted. British Prime Minister Tony Blair commented, "We can only imagine the terror and 
carnage there... [this was] perpetrated by fanatics who are utterly indifferent to the sanctity of 
human life, and we, the democracies of this world, are going to have to come together to fight it 
and eradicate this evil completely from our world." Israeli Prime Minister Ariel Sharon said "Our 
hearts are with you and we are ready to provide any assistance at any time... [the attacks would 
be] a turning point in the war against international terror." French President Jacques Chirac 
asserted "In these terrible circumstances, all French people stand by the American people. We 
express our friendship and solidarity in this tragedy." Even America’s adversaries extended their 
condolences. Libyan leader Moammar Gadhafi suggested that "Irrespective of the conflict with 
America it is a human duty to show sympathy with the American people, and be with them at 
these horrifying and awesome events which are bound to awaken human conscience." Syrian 
President Bashar Assad called for "world cooperation to eradicate all kinds of terrorism." Iranian 
President Mohammad Khatami declared "it is an international duty to try to undermine 
terrorism."[45]  
September 11th expanded Bush’s freedom of action and, thereby, the political opportunity to 
engage in a "systematic campaign against terrorism."[46] He had the American public as well as 
the international community by his side. "Sixty years of Western nations excusing and 
accommodating the lack of freedom in the Middle East did nothing to make us safe... As long as 
the Middle East remains a place where freedom does not flourish, it will remain a place of 
stagnation, resentment, and violence ready for export," reasoned Bush.[47] "America's 
determination to actively oppose the threats of our time was formed and fixed on September the 
11th, 2001. On that day we saw the cruelty of the terrorists, and we glimpsed the future they 
intend for us," he added.[48] To oppose these threats, the United States must build "lasting, 
democratic peace... by supporting the rise of democracy, and the hope and progress that 
democracy brings, as the alternative to hatred and terror in the broader Middle East."[49] To 
preempt the exportation of violence, the United States will export democracy—"American" 
democracy. In support of that effort, the U.S. State Department’s Human Rights and Democracy 
Fund spending in the Middle East increased from $205,000 in fiscal year 1998/1999 to 
$9,581,850 in fiscal year 2004/2005.[50]  
President Bush has a formidable mobilizing structure—that is, he has an extensive amount of 
resources at his disposal. Still, the terrorist attack enabled him to further augment his assets by 
providing him the "singular target of conflict" to rally more aid.[51] He could utilize the 
international organizations already advocating democracy whether directly or implicitly through 
their charter. In this category, he has the United Nations, International Monetary Fund (IMF) and 
World Bank. Another category consisted of international agencies with the explicit mission of 
advancing American foreign policy. In this field he had the Bureau of International Organization 
Affairs (IO); Democracy, Human Rights and Labor (DRL); and U.S. Agency for International 
Development (USAID). Lastly, he could use his network of Non-Governmental Organizations 
(NGO). The most prominent of which were the National Endowment for Democracy (and its 
subordinate organizations) and Freedom House. NED is credited to have facilitated the 
democratic transition of Chile and Nicaragua.[52] These highlighted organizations do not begin to 
capture the amount of resources Bush has access to. He could use his vast diplomatic networks 
to tap into ally resources, but with a Gross National Product (GNP) of $10.99 trillion—the largest 
in the world—the United States can readily meet her most critical needs.[53] In essence, the 
United States has the discretionary funds to subcontract, hire, and implement programs with 
relative ease. Alternatively, Bush can exploit NGOs already present in the region. For example, in 
2004 an estimated 14,000 NGOs were registered in Egypt.[54] Equally as effective, the president 
used and also has the media as a resource to mobilize support and frame future agendas.[55] In 
fact, the global media facilitated the expedient mobilizing of the international community’s support 
for the American people. Realizing the significance of the media for mobilizing and framing, the 
Bush administration launched the Middle East Radio Network to convey America’s message in 
March 2002.[56] Bush expressed "... Middle East Radio Network will offer... reliable news, and 
information in Arabic, and an opportunity to better understand American principles and American 
actions."[57] In addition to these non-violent persuasive tools, Bush has the best military in the 
world supported by the latest technology. Needless to say, President Bush’s resource 
mobilization structure already well endowed became overflowing.  
Bush used his gained advantages to develop a cultural framing consistent with what Charles Tilly 
suggested socials movement aim to achieve—that is, the WUNC principle. Social movements 
must show their audience that they are Worth the demands they seek; present a Unified front; 
have the Numbers necessary to back their stake, and convince the public, adversary, and others 
that they are Committed.[58] President Bush managed to succinctly address all elements of the 
WUNC principle. He asserted "Our people are united; our government is determined; our cause is 
right; and justice will be done. Our cause is just. We will not tire. We will not falter. And, my fellow 
Americans, we will not fail." To sustain support, President Bush remained flexible and altered his 
framing from one dominated by "security" jargon to one of "democracy." This revision enabled 
him to reinvigorate a traditional concept which the majority of Americans hold dear – democracy. 
As Glenn Robinson commented, Bush’s bumper-sticker became "Stop a Terrorist... Spread 
Democracy!"[59]  
Like past American presidents, Bush used familiar and traditional tactical repertoire to advance 
his objectives. Bush pressured for Middle East compliance using financial incentives and support 
of domestic opposition forces. For instance, the Bush administration reportedly withheld $350 
million in assistance to Egypt to protest the arrest of Saadeddin Ibrahim in 2002. The Egyptian 
authorities arrested Ibrahim for promoting political, civil and electoral rights. Also, the U.S. 
Ambassador David Welch met with Egyptian oppositional leaders. Welch defended his 
prerogative to meet with these leaders, and stated "I consider that a natural role of an American 
ambassador in any country, and a perfectly natural one here in Egypt."[60] In another example, 
Welch provided six Egyptian NGOs one million dollars in support of pro-democratic related 
activities.[61]  
Though Bush pursues these non-violent means as cost effective alternatives to promoting 
"American" democracy, he has not been averse to using force to achieve his vision. In fact he 
clarified "I will do whatever it takes to defend America and prevail in the war on terror."[62] He 
backed those words with action. In October 2001, he invaded Afghanistan. In March 2003, he 
invaded Iraq. The United States is in "a war against all those who seek to export terror, and a war 
against those governments that support or shelter them," he explained. Bush also added, "We 
removed terror regimes in Afghanistan and Iraq. We are on the offensive around the world, 
because the best way to prevent future attacks is to go after the enemy."[63] Furthermore, Bush 
insisted "We seek the advance of democracy for the most practical of reasons: because 
democracies do not support terrorists or threaten the world with weapons of mass murder."[64]  
Conclusion  
Using social movement theory allows us to systematically study dynamics to better explain and 
predict collective behavior. As Tilly noted we need to review various national and international 
activities for there are "parallels and connections that transcend geographic boundaries and 
scales."[65] Looking at "American" democracy through the prism of a social movement and 
establishing that it is a transnational social movement enables other social movement 
mechanisms to be analyzed. For instance, how will "American" democracy interact with host 
Middle Eastern states, national countermovement like Islamists, or civil society? How will these 
interactions, whether contentious or friendly, support or impede the establishment of democratic 
institutions? Using previously studied cases, analogies can be applied to study these interactions 
and answer the nagging riddle of why American coercive democratization of the Middle East is 
unlikely to lead to liberal democracies. 
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